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From
The American Conservative:
In 1919, the British military was
instructed to proceed on the assumption that it would not fight a major
war for the next 10 years. The army, discredited in the eyes of the
public by four years of seemingly futile bloodshed on the continent,
returned to its prewar role as a colonial police force. The naval budget
was slashed from £188 million in 1919 to just £52 million in 1923.
Postwar ship-building programs were shelved in favor of international
arms control, embodied by Britain’s unprecedented acquiescence to naval
limitations at the 1921 Washington Conference.
Despite this precipitous reduction in
defense spending, it seemed as if Great Britain had resumed her historic
role as an imperial power free of European entanglements. With the
acquisition of new territories in Africa and the Middle East, the
British Empire appeared more formidable than ever. In truth, the
shortsightedness of Britain’s leadership during this period ensured that
she was ill-equipped for the turbulent 1930s.
The parallels between Britain’s
interwar myopia and today’s American foreign policy establishment, which
is relentlessly fixated on Russia and the Middle East even as a rising
China presents profound new security challenges, should be obvious. For at least a few years after the
First World War, it seemed as if Britain had successfully turned back
the clock. The country’s large conscript army was hastily replaced by a
much smaller force of long-serving professionals. Before World War I,
the British navy’s fighting strength had been ruthlessly consolidated in
the North Sea to meet the rising German threat. Foreign squadrons were
recalled and obsolete older warships retired. Arrangements were made,
first with the Japanese and later with the French and Italians, for
naval burden-sharing in the Far East and the Mediterranean. (Read more.)
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