Fiat Money Inflation in France documents one of the causes of
the French Revolution and the triggering cause that pressured Louis XVI
to convene the Estates General in May 1789. The first sentence of Fiat Money Inflation
describes the challenges the delegates faced: “Early in the year 1789
the French Nation found itself in deep financial embarrassment: there
was a heavy debt and serious deficit.”
The cause can be traced as far back as the wars waged by Louis XIV as
well as by his luxurious spending. At his death in 1715, a regency
government faced a similar challenge and pursued a similar paper money
strategy in order to avoid the harsh actions that economics dictated.
The result was the disastrous Mississippi Scheme engineered by a
charismatic Scot, John Law, who had made his way into the position of
Controller General of Finances in France. The Mississippi Scheme
collapsed spectacularly in 1720, less than 70 years prior to the crisis
that the Estates General (soon to be renamed General Assembly) attempted
to address. Although the danger of paper money was well known and there
was adequate financial knowledge in the General Assembly, “oratory
prevailed over science and experience.”
The rationalization for the issuance of irredeemable paper money was
the familiar appeal to ignore history — “This time is different.” Part
of the argument was that the money was backed by the value of land
seized from the Catholic Church by the General Assembly. In addition,
according to one paper money supporter:
Paper money under a despotism is dangerous; it favors
corruption. But in a nation constitutionally governed, which itself
takes care in the emission of notes, which determines their number and
use, that danger no longer exists.
It was the ultimate statement of faith in the wisdom of the majority.
The first issue of assignats occurred in April 1790 in the
amount of 400 million livres (later, francs). Initially, this was to be
the only issue of paper money, but in five months the promise was
broken, and 1,200 million francs were in circulation. Two years after
the first issuance of paper money, the fifth issue had occurred, and
2,800 million francs circulated. In 1796, when the machinery, plates,
and paper for printing assignats were finally destroyed, there were
40,000 million assignats in circulation, 100 times as many as were
initially issued. Assignats were then replaced with new notes, mandats,
which suffered a similar devaluation a year later when legal-tender
protection of both paper currencies was revoked, rendering them
worthless.
The immediate challenge for the government in 1790 had been the
elimination of the deficit, but the Revolution’s leaders had another
goal: “to get this land distributed among the thrifty middle classes,
and so commit them to the Revolution and the government that gave their
title.”
For some, the plan worked very well, as they paid off their
obligations to the government with future devalued assignats. But
overall, the plan had a flaw: “One simple fact, as stated by John Stuart
Mill, … was that the vast majority of people could not afford to make
investments outside of their business.”
Nor was the alleged relief of the debtor class relief of the poor.
The wealthy could accumulate debt, but the poor live hand to mouth.
Additionally, increasing unemployment from failed business and wages
unable to keep up with price increases on necessities resulted in a
situation in which “all that saved thousands of laborers in France from
starvation was that they were drafted off into the army and sent to be
killed on foreign battlefields.”
Inflation impacted the poor more than the wealthy. The washerwomen of
Paris found they could no longer pay, nor could shopkeepers afford to
sell the soap for the depreciated assignats.
[Radical revolutionary journalist Jean-Paul] Marat
declared loudly that the people, by hanging shopkeepers and plundering
stores, could easily remove the problem.
This was followed by forced loans on the wealthy, by repudiation of
the first issue of paper money that was considered more valuable because
it bore the image of the king, and by a decreed “maximum” of prices
that might be charged. None of these measures addressed the underlying
economic problems but served only to introduce further chaos into the
economy. Those who did not comply with the government’s coercive
measures found themselves at the guillotine, followed by those who were
merely suspected of infractions or just lack of support for the
Revolution. The Reign of Terror was on.
White observed moral deterioration: “Out of the inflation of prices
grew a speculating class; and, in the complete uncertainty as to the
future, all business became a game of chance, and all businessmen,
gamblers.”
Some speculators were successful and became immensely rich, but the
French nation in general abandoned thrift, which ultimately is the basis
for sound investment in future improved productivity:
Financiers and men of large means were shrewd enough to put as much
of their property as possible into objects of permanent value. The
working classes had no such foresight or skill or means. On them finally
came the great crushing weight of the loss. (Read more.)